Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) 
Key Settlement Phase: This phase is to make that each node has a pair of keys for the public key cryptosystem, a public key and a private key. Sink node performs the role of a PKG. It is assumed that sink has a super power than the other nodes, cluster heads have superior than sensor nodes but lower than sink, and sensor nodes have the lower rights than any other nodes, and the role of nodes is pre-allocated before the phase. Figure 1 shows the concept of Kim's key settlement phase for the hierarchical WSN. To set up keys, the protocol performs the following operations 
Step 2. The source node CM ij sends an encrypted data packet and the message digest MAC=h(sk||the encrypted data packet) to it's counterpart node CM kl , which is encrypted by using the agreed session key sk.
Step 3. After receiving the encrypted message, the destination node CM kl checks the validity of MAC by using the agreed session key sk. Only if the validity check is successful, CM kl accepts the message from CM ij , which means that the encrypted message is successfully transferred by using the agreed secure channel based on sk.
No Key Freshness Support Problem in Kim's HKAP
A key establishment or agreement process among the participants should guarantee that each shared session key is fresh, i.e. has not been reused by one of the participants [15] . This also means that a key used in one cryptographic association has not been used in another association. Thus, the session key needs to be changed over time since a key may be compromised during pre-deployment or operational phases of communication networks. In Kim's naïve HKAP, each party computes sk between any two entities in the WSN, which depends on both of their own private key and identity tuples but not on the session dependent random value. Thereby, the naïve HKAP does not provide key freshness. No freshness support means that the established session keys in different sessions are always the same, which could provide some means or useful information to attacker. One of serious effects is traffic analysis attack, which is focused on traffic flow identification, traffic flow tracking, or disclosing application-level information.
Hierarchical Key Agreement Protocol with Freshness Property
This section proposes two new hierarchical key agreement protocols with freshness property, named as naïve HKAP_FP and privacy HKAP-FP, using pairings over the hierarchical WSNs. They fall into two phases: a hierarchical key settlement phase and a session key agreement and secure communication phase. The first phase is for setting up the system which is the same as Kim's, and the other one is to communicate by using a secure channel after establishing a fresh session key between any two nodes in the hierarchical WSN.
We assume the same assumptions in Kim's HKAP that the network is formed in hierarchy, one hop is considered between sensor nodes and a head in a cluster and multiple hops are assumed between cluster heads and the sink over the network. Thereby, this paper also follows the hierarchy of WSN and considers a hierarchical tree with depth 3. For the tree construction, it is assumed that the degree of sink node is u and the degree of cluster head is v, respectively, which are determined by the number of nodes n in a WSN and the protocol uses the related previous schemes to form equally distributed clusters in the network.
Naïve HKAP
To establish a shared key between two nodes in a WSN, it is necessary to preestablish secret keys. The purpose of key settlement phase is to establish necessary secret keys before they are deployed. Nodes in WSNs indeed have met before their deployment because all these nodes usually belong to the same administrative entity. This is a major difference between WSN environments and the other mobile network environments. In many WSN applications, sensor nodes do know and trust each other before the deployment. In other words, before their deployment, sensor nodes are in a benign environment where they can exchange information in plaintext and thus establish trust relationships among themselves Hierarchical Key Settlement Phase: This phase is the same as in Kim's HKAP, which is described in Section 2.
Session Key Agreement and Secure Communication Phase:
The purpose of this phase is to establish a secure channel by establishing a secure fresh session key between any two nodes in the WSN. To establish a shared session key, CM ij and CM kl conduct the following tasks
Step 
CM kl assures the correctness of the established fresh session key only if the validity check of MAC 1 is successful by comparing it with h(sk, R 1 ).
Step 3. CM kl sends back an encrypted data packet with the message digest MAC 2 =h(sk||the encrypted data packet) to it's counterpart node CM ij , which is encrypted by using the agreed session key sk.
Step 4. After receiving the encrypted message, CM ij checks the validity of MAC 2 by using the agreed session key sk. Only if the validity check is successful, CM ij accepts the message from CM kl , which means that the encrypted message is successfully transferred by using the agreed secure channel based on sk.
The proposed session key agreement and secure communication phase has a good advantage in the perspective of communication cost to agree on a fresh session key.
Privacy HKAP_FP
To support the privacy issue, this subsection further proposes a privacy supporting HKAP_FP based on the Naïve one by using amplified identities not using real identities of nodes.
Hierarchical Key Settlement Phase:
The assumptions and steps of this phase for the privacy HKAP_FP are the same as Kim's privacy HKAP in [9] . Fig. 2 shows a concept of the hierarchical key settlement phase for the privacy HKAP_FP. To set up keys, the phase performs the following operations
Step The purpose of this phase is to establish a secure channel by establishing a fresh session key between any two nodes in the WSN. To establish a shared fresh session key, CM ij and CM kl conduct the following tasks
Step 4. After receiving the encrypted message, CM ij checks the validity of MAC 2 by using the agreed fresh session key sk. Only if the validity check is successful, CM ij accepts the message from CM kl , which means that the encrypted message is successfully transferred by using the agreed secure channel based on sk.
The proposed session key agreement and secure communication phase has a good advantage in the perspective of node communication cost to agree on a fresh session key.
Analyses
This section provides only security analyses focused on the privacy HKAP_FP. We follow the approaches used in [16] for comparison purpose. This section gives computational problems, which are based on the security of our protocols and provides various security analyses.
Computational Problems
Bilinear map captures an important cryptographic problem, i.e., the Biliniear DiffieHellman (BDH) problem, which was introduced by Boneh and Franklin in [13] . The security of our protocol relies on a variant of the BDH assumption.
Let G and G T be two groups of a prime order q. Suppose that there exists a bilinear map ê: GⅹG→G T . We consider the following computational assumptions
• Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) : For a, b, and c  R Z q * and given aP, bP, and cP, computing ê(P, P) abc is hard • Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) : For a, b, and c  R Z q * , differentiating (aP, bP, cP, ê(P, P) abc ) and (aP, bP, cP, ê(P, P) r ) is hard 1. A completeness of the key agreement protocol is already proven by describing the run of the protocol in section 3. 2. If the adversary is passive adversary, all the adversary can gather are as follows: the amplified identity set {E S ′, E CHj ′, E CMk ′} and the message digest MAC. However, it is negligible to find the key related information from them due to the difficulty of the underlying cryptosystem, the BDH problem, and the DBDH problem.
Finally, we could say the proposed privacy HKAP_FP is secure against passive attack.
Proposition 5.
The proposed privacy HKAP_FP is secure against active attack. Proof: We assume that an adversary is success if the adversary finds the session key sk or the session key related information {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 }. Therefore, we show that probability to succeed in finding them is negligible due to the difficulty of the underlying cryptosystem, the BDH problem, and the DBDH problem.
1. The acceptance by all entities means that each MAC in the corresponding message is successfully verified. That is, MAC is decrypted and verified successfully by using the correct session key sk. We show that if it is the case that entities accept the messages and continue the session, then the probability that the adversary have modified the messages being transmitted is negligible. And the only way for the adversary to find the session key or security related information is to solve the difficulty of the underlying cryptosystem, the BDH problem, and the DBDH problem. 2. Now, we consider the active adversary with following cases.
(a) There is no way that an adversary could get the secret information {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 } due to the difficulty of the BDH problem and the DBDH problem. (b) An adversary cannot impersonate CM ij or CH i to cheat the sink. That is the attacker cannot generate valid messages without deriving the correct session key sk, since the attacker cannot pass the verification of MAC in the protocol. (c) An adversary cannot impersonate the sink to cheat CM ij or CH i . As described above, only the legal sink can form the legal messages by including the proper check sum, which needs to be properly matched with the information from CM ij or CH i in the protocol steps. Even if the attacker could pass the verifications at the protocol steps, the attacker still cannot get any useful information from the encrypted messages due to the difficulty of the underlying public-key cryptosystem and cannot generate the consequent valid messages.
Finally, we could say the proposed privacy HKAP_FP is secure against active attack.
Comparison
Key management in WSNs demands extra space to keep the required keys for the secure communication. The performance comparisons provided in this subsection presents the space and computation overhead that are related with the size of the key set. A simple node stores at least three key related information from {S 1 , S 2 , S 3 }. Table 2 shows the feature comparisons between the proposed privacy HKAP_FP, Kim's HKAP in [9] and Guo et al. ' s, protocol in [10] . The size of key set in Guo et al.'s, protocol is dependent with the number of nodes in the network but not in HKAP and our HKAP_FP, which keeps the same size of key set with constant of 3. Furthermore, the computational overhead in our HKAP_FP does not affect to the size of key set but Guo et al.'s, protocol does affect. This is very important property especially in WSN with the limits of battery life or resource constraints.
Conclusion
Recently, Guo et al., proposed an efficient and non-interactive hierarchical key agreement protocol applicable to mobile ad-hoc networks. However, their protocol could not be applied to the WSNs as it is due to the WSN's uniqueness. Thereby, Kim proposed two privacy supporting non-interactive hierarchical key agreement protocols over the hierarchical WSNs, which is a revised version of Guo et al. ' s, protocol for the WSNs. Kim's protocols are secure against the corruption of any number of nodes at any level in the hierarchy. However, Kim's protocols do not support freshness of the established session key that key agreement protocol should supports. Thereby, we proposed two freshness preserving hierarchical key agreement protocols over the hierarchical WSNs. Our revisions inherit advantages from Kim's protocols and well suited to the hierarchical WSNs.
